RELATIVIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE POSSESSION – A POSSESSION WITHAUT FACTUAL AUTHORITIES ON THINGS AND FACTUAL AUTHORITIES ON THINGS WITHAUT A POSSESSION

Abstract

The factual authorities is actually a "general place" of the conceptual determination of the possession. Despite that, it is not always a compulsory element of the state, which contradictory of this seemingly simple institute, further contributes. In this paper, we are trying to brighten this element of state contradictions, stating cases of the existence of a state without the existence of factual authorities, as well as cases of the existence of the factual authority, without the existence of the possession. The possessions conceptually designated as a "factual authority of object" is therefore not the only and eternal truth about the notion of the possession, it is most often, because of that only its typological but not the only conceptual design. There is no "universal" concept of a possession, which would always and everywhere be independent of a specific legal order. But, alone (or only) the factual authority is still far from the possession. Which cases of factual authorities, as well as cases without that factual government, will be recognized as a possession, it does not depend on doctrinal, legal-theoretical reasons, but legal-political. Depending on that, some social relations will be legally updated in the possession and some not, regardless of the existence or non-existence of the factual government.